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A trend towards the individualization and increasing flexibility of employment 
relationships has characterized many sectors of the French economy in recent years. 
This has challenged traditional systems of defining work and qualifying workers, 
although the unlimited-term employment contract is still the main legal framework 
used in employment relations
1
. The most recent empirical studies show the multiplicity 
of employment relationships with reference to differentiated personnel management 
practices in firms (Petit, 2003; Beffa et ali., 1999). Based on these studies, some 
authors emphasize the fact that French labour legislation affords a degree of flexibility. 
This allows for diversity by multiplying the legal forms of the employment contract, 
witnessed primarily in the increase in so-called particular contracts that depart from 
the unlimited-term contract norm, or contracts based on commercial law. From a more 
normative point of view these authors propose reforms to labour law, intended to 
enhance its coherence and widen its diversity so that the complementarity of the 
various employment relationships can be recognized and guaranteed (Beffa et ali., 
1999). Other authors, in the tradition of the De Virville Report (2004), propose new 
contracts such as the 'project contract' as well as reforms to French labour legislation 
by increasing the formalism of the unlimited-term contract. In a configuration marked 
by greater flexibility and differentiation of labour conditions, employees should have 
to sign a real 'job contract' with their employer, in which the terms of their mutual 
commitments are explicitly stated (Bessy, 2004). 
It was based on this type of questioning on the formalism of the employment contract 
that we studied practices concerning the drafting of contracts. The general idea was to 
illuminate current practices in firms and their use of the law in the drafting of 
employment 'contracts'
2
. Our findings show that, apart from the authentification of the 
act of recruitment and formal obligations concerning particular contracts, the 
significance and purposes of a written document can differ. For instance, the 'contract' 
                                                 
1
 Unlimited-term contracts currently account for roughly 90% of all employment contracts (in 
stock). 
2
 Throughout the rest of this article and for practical purposes we have put the word 'contract' 
in quotes to indicate that these are not always real contracts – unless we apply a purely formal 
definition that limits the employment contract to a written document signed by both parties. 
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may simply be intended to inform employees of their main employment conditions 
which have been defined elsewhere, usually in collective bargaining. But the drafting 
of the 'contract' may be oriented more systematically towards providing guarantees in 
the event of dispute or conflict, going so far as a form of instrumentalization of the law 
for the sole benefit of the employer's security as regards the law. 
Our main hypothesis is that these uses of the law are not unrelated to the firms' 
personnel management practices, to the fact of their aiming for flexibility or not, and 
to the employees' subordination or individual accountability. In fact they participate in 
such practices. The content of the 'contract', that to varying degrees crystallizes a 
learning process related to prior disputes, can then be considered as a source of 
information on the rules framing the employment relationship or, at least, the rules in 
relation to which the parties seek guarantees of one kind or another. 
It is in this perspective of analysing the practices concerning the drafting of 
employment 'contracts', in relation to firms' manpower management methods, that we 
compiled a data base of 'contracts' (see annexe). The data base consists of a total of 
309 'contracts', most of which were signed in the past ten years. Over 200 firms in 
various sectors are represented. We completed this information with data on the 
characteristics of the firms and the jobs concerned, and constructed a coding grid to 
identify the various types of information in the 'contracts'. This served us for our 
quantitative analysis and construction of a typology of 'employment contracts' that 
enabled us to identify interdependencies between these different types of information. 
This work also drew on a series of interviews in firms and with legal experts, that 
furthered our understanding of the objectives of the people who draft employment 
'contracts' and their anticipation of possible disputes
3
. 
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 This research owes a great deal to an initial exploratory survey on the possibilities of 
constructing an 'employment contract' data base, undertaken for a report financed by the 
French Ministry of Research (Bernardi et al., 2003). We wish to thank the authors of that 
early report for their subsequent contribution and advice. We also wish to thank C. Teissier 
for his encouragement and wise comments, as well as C. Didry and E. Serverin who were 
involved in the first phase of this work. The present study has been financed by the French 
Ministry of Social Affairs, Work and Solidarity. 
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In the first part of this paper we present our framework of analysis based on an 
institutionalist approach to employment relations. This approach is in turn based on the 
French economy of conventions approach (Bessy and Favereau, 2003) and certain 
arguments of neo-institutional theory as defined by Williamson (1985). We have used 
this framework of analysis here more to illuminate our research question, to construct 
our variables and to interpret our findings than to propose a validation in relation to 
other analytical hypotheses. Our subject is above all empirical and designed to show 
the advantages of constructing an 'employment contract' data base. This type of data 
base can be used to identify differentiated practices and provide empirical material to 
illuminate French reforms concerning labour contract legislation, in the absence of 
sound empirical data on the subject
4
. In this perspective we also provide information 
on the French legal conception of the employment contract. 
In the second section we justify the choice of variables taken into account in 
multidimensional statistical analysis, including those that participate actively and those 
that are simply illustrative. In the third section we present the results of our typology 
and in the fourth section we discuss them and show certain limits of the present data 
base. 
1- The framework of analysis and French employment contract law 
The analysis of 'contractual choices' has been the subject of an abundant economic 
literature over the past three decades (see Masten, 1999). Several currents in that 
literature emphasize the 'incomplete' nature of contracts due to the parties' 
impossibility of foreseeing all possible contingencies and the high cost of court action. 
In particular, neo-institutional theory stresses the relational dimension of certain 
contracts (relational contracting). In configurations where the aim is to perpetuate the 
relationship, agreement between the parties is based less on a detailed specification of 
obligations than on a general framework defining the process of adjustment of the 
terms of agreement over time, that is, a set of constituent rules framing future 
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 No 'employment contract' data base is currently available and no survey has been undertaken 
to assess the actual content of 'employment contracts', such as the WERS survey in the UK 
(Brown et ali., 2000). 
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interactions (Goldberg, 1976; Macneil, 1978). In this perspective, 'complete contracts' 
can only frame short-term relationships based on largely unspecified resources and 
fairly stable expectations concerning possible points of dispute for which the courts are 
considered competent. 
Within the neo-institutional current, based on the economy of transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1985), many empirical studies that draw on 'contract' data bases have 
shown regularities between certain contractual terms and the characteristics of 
transactions (Masten, 1999). However, few studies have specifically analysed the 
contracting parties' expectations when they sign a written document. The study by 
Lyons (2000) on a survey of British inter-firm agreements in the manufacturing sector 
is an exception. We have chosen here not to discuss the results of this survey which 
are fragile because the author is confronted with the difficulty of measuring the 
'completeness' of contracts in 'relational contracting'. Our starting point is simply the 
question of the written or unwritten nature of the contract and the role of written 
contracts. Two roles can be distinguished. First, written undertakings can be designed 
to ensure that each party is fully aware of the terms of the relationship, and to clarify 
those terms. Second, the parties may want to protect themselves by introducing clauses 
that they believe have a direct legal effect in case of breach of contract. The results 
show that the former objective is the most prevalent even if court action is frequent in 
case of dispute. 
We have opted for two lines of interpretation of our results. One concerns the role of 
the written 'contract' and, in particular, the distinction between the aim of clarifying 
employment conditions and that of providing legal protection. The other line of 
interpretation is based on the idea that the parties in the transaction put into writing 
those clauses that can legally be defended the most easily in case of dispute. As 
regards the rest, their intention is to frame their relationship by a set of implicit rules 
allowing adjustments over time, especially if they wish to perpetuate the relationship 
and therefore to make specific commitments. 
These two ideas must nevertheless be adjusted to the nature of our 'contract' data base 
and especially its context: the French labour market. As regards the data, all we have is 
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the 'contracts' themselves and certain information on the characteristics of the jobs and 
the firms concerned. There is no possibility of directly measuring the nature of the 
commitments underlying the employment relationship. As regards the labour market, 
contractualization practices are infrequent due to the weakness of the employees' 
position and the protective role that the law and collective labour agreements play in 
their respect. These characteristics are probably even more marked in the case of 
France, compared to the UK for instance
5
, due to the weight of State intervention in 
regulation of the labour market and collective bargaining. Moreover, apart from 
differences in the judicial culture, French labour law was initially constructed in 
opposition to the Civil Code and especially to the fiction of a contract based on the 
equality between the parties. 
We therefore assume that the text of the written employment contract signed at the 
time of recruitment is not neutral
6
 and that its formulation and content are based on a 
certain conception of the employment relationship and a set of implicit rules defining 
mutual expectations. Although the interests of the parties concerned by the 
employment relationship are distinct and antagonistic, they do rest on a certain form of 
solidarity conducive to cooperation. This cooperative commitment binding the parties 
acts in a complementary way to their more formal contractual commitments with 
directly judicial consequences. The idea is not that these formal obligations codify 
cooperative commitments themselves, which are subject to mutual tolerance, but 
simply that they provide benchmarks for settling disputes between the parties when 
they consider that there has been breach of mutual tolerance and violation of the 
implicit rules. 
The concept of an implicit rule as we use it differs considerably from that developed 
by relational contracting theory (Williamson, 1985) in which the inter-individual 
dimension of the agreement is emphasized, with little importance granted to its 
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 Although the institutional environment is different, research on the British case shows that 
contractualization has not been developed in employment relations and that written 
documents generally have an informative purpose. See Brown et ali. (1998). 
6
 As in the case of an earlier study on job advertisements (Bessy et ali., 2001). 
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collective dimension, that is, observance of rules governing interaction, defined by a 
group or a larger community
7
. What we introduce as well is the idea that cooperative 
commitment has meaning in a collective with shared values such as the firm, a branch 
of industry, a particular territory or even society as a whole. 
To understand the context of the French labour market we need to revert to the 
plurality of representations of the common good, referred to here as 'conventions', 
underlying the social link and State intervention. Via legislation, the State decides on 
the order of priority to establish in the medium term between the main classes of social 
goods
8
. Three types of convention or model of implicit relationship can be 
distinguished. The stability of these conventions or models is provided by the rules of 
French labour law, the justification and codification of which were initially based on 
the conventions. This enables us to account for the plurality of principles of 
justification in which French employment contract legislation is grounded, as the 
controversies between the different legal doctrines attest (Bessy and Eymard-
Duvernay, 1995). 
The status model 
The first model of implicit relationship corresponds to an employment relationship 
governed primarily by a negotiated collective status, based on job stability. The 
employee's expectation is based on job security within the firm and on the fact that the 
labour and employment rules are defined in relation to a 'work post'. This allows for a 
high level of equality that leaves room for forms of remuneration based on individual 
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 We are referring to Lindenberg's (1998) critique of Williamson, based on his theory of 
sharing groups and relational signals. This critique rests on the idea that the distinction 
between different contractual forms does not correspond to different equilibriums of the same 
framework of strategic calculation, but that there can be frame duality. The results of 
interaction in which an interest is at stake are judged both on their content and on the 
relational signal that emerges. Any behaviour constitutes a relational signal of a form of 
relationship, especially since relations of cooperation, if not of solidarity, are fragile. This 
makes problems of interpreting these signals all the more difficult, and justifies the role of 
groups who guarantee and memorize the rules for interpreting these signals. 
8
 Based on the pluralistic theory of justice defended by Boltanski and Thévenot (1991), in 
Bessy and Favereau (2003) we show the articulation between different principles of 
justification of the common good and legal rules.  
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performance. In this configuration, adjustments that can depart from the most codified 
norms must nevertheless be set on rules transcending particular arrangements. For a 
long time this type of employment relationship constituted a powerful model of 
inspiration of French labour legislation. Due to the de facto inequality between the 
parties, the legislation was designed to protect the worker in relation to a status 
(Camerlinck, 1958). In addition to this specifically French model (Marsden, 1999), 
two other models applied more frequently in other countries can be distinguished. 
The hierarchical authority model 
The second implicit model, that has also inspired labour legislation and especially the 
definition of the employment contract based on a relationship of subordination, relates 
to the hierarchical authority of the employer who must nevertheless make decisions in 
the interests of the firm (Durand, 1947). This is the relationship of authority described 
by Williamson (1985) and modelled by Simon (1951). Flexibility is promoted in so far 
as the employee agrees to an authority that assigns tasks, although within certain 
limits, and can impose sanctions. This model has nevertheless evolved due to the legal 
framework limiting the employer's disciplinary power (the so-called Auroux laws of 
1982), and to changes in customs that challenge hierarchical authority and promote 
greater autonomy of workers. 
The market model 
In these first two models the role of the contract is reduced to next to nothing; it serves 
primarily to trigger a set of pre-established rules. By contrast, in the third model the 
role of the contract is more assertive in the definition of the employment relationship. 
Here the parties enjoy a degree of contractual freedom at the origins of the concept of 
a contract inherited from the French Civil Code (in which the 'rental' of services is 
referred to) and based on the equality of the parties. Due to greater symmetry in each 
party's powers of negotiation, the contract creates a system in which the interests at 
play are balanced, and thus a more complete form of contractualization. In particular, 
it introduces clauses of variation depending on the expected contingencies, and 
mechanisms for rewarding individual performance. Although they are important, the 
more formal terms of the contract are simply benchmarks from which the actors can 
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depart if there is a need to adjust to market constraints. It is in this sense that we talk of 
a 'market model'. But in this model the perpetuation of the relationship is not 
necessarily an objective. When the terms of the 'contract' are challenged it is its most 
formal characteristics that are used in legal proceedings. 
These different types of convention can be mixed and constitute pre-established 
models of action to which the parties in the employment relationship can refer. Until 
recently (the late eighties and early nineties), most employment contracts in France 
were considered by jurists to be standard terms agreements ('contrats d'adhésion'), that 
is, non-negotiable. Employment relations based on a contractual frame negotiated by 
both parties were exceptions. 
In this particular configuration the predominant legal conception of the employment 
contract is based on a compromise between the hierarchical authority model and the 
status model. The inter-individual agreement attesting to the employment contract is 
only an 'act condition' that leads to adhesion to a pre-established professional status 
and respect for the employer's authority. This makes the signing of a written document 
more relevant, especially when the firm wants to retain all its powers to define the 
employment conditions. When 'employment contracts' are put into written form, the 
intention is primarily to inform employees of their conditions of employment. Most of 
these conditions are determined by the law or collective bargaining (salary, working 
hours, job definition with reference to a classification). In the absence of an obligation 
concerning the form of an unlimited-term contract, only industry-wide collective 
labour agreements require that employees be given a written document informing them 
of their main conditions of employment. 
This legal conception of the employment contract evolved in France under the impact 
of at least two factors. First, the arrival of Community law with, in particular, the 
European directive of 14 October 1991 relative to the employer's obligation to inform 
the employee of the conditions applicable to the employment contract or relationship. 
Apart from providing better protection for employees, by granting them the right to 
individual information, this obligation should allow for greater transparency of the 
labour market. The study of changes in certain industry-wide collective labour 
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agreements shows that by transposing this obligation to inform, contract law 
participates in the codification of inter-individual employment relations. 
But this change is even clearer with the switch in judicial precedents in the late 
eighties and early nineties, concerning amendments to the employment contract. The 
employer's power is now limited in so far as any proposal to amend an essential 
element in the labour contract has to be explicitly approved by the employee 
(Wacquet, 1999). Claiming to protect employees, legal precedents reaffirm the 
contract mechanism and the value of initial commitments in an economic 
configuration – despite the fact of it being marked by a strong demand for flexibility in 
employment relationships
9
. The negotiation of flexibility should therefore be shifted to 
collective bargaining where the interests of the parties are more fairly balanced. 
These two legal factors have resulted in more explicit commitments and therefore to 
an increase in written 'contracts' in recent years. This is confirmed by our interviews in 
firms in various sectors. In addition, more economic factors have led to the 
individualization of the employment relationship, especially as regards the 
remuneration of individual performance. 
All these factors contribute towards a certain 'revival of the employment contract' and 
the development of contractualization practices, but without reducing the diversity of 
such 'contracts' as regards employment conditions and the role of the written 
document. The documents in our data base are thus a source of information on 
employees' working conditions that enables us to contrast different types of labour 
relations. 
We posit, moreover, that this type of document also makes it possible to identify the 
different parties' objectives when they draw up the employment contract, and 
especially the role they intend contract law to play in legally protecting their interests. 
Considering the high empirical cost of extending our research directly to the actors' 
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 These decisions are based on Article 1134 of the Civil Code that specifies the precedence of 
initial commitments in the main terms of the employment contract. 
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intentions when they drew up a 'contract', we adopted an indirect approach based on 
the implicit models of employment relations defined above. 
Hence, the market model of the employment relationship corresponds closest to a 
narrow specification of the terms of the individual employment contract and relies on 
the most formal characteristics in case of dispute. But reliance on formal obligations 
can be developed in all cases where the employer wants enhanced legal safeguards due 
to changes in labour contract legislation. This gives us a clue as to how to interpret the 
fact that when agreements are being drawn up, employers introduce clauses to escape 
the constraint of the law, primarily concerning flexibility in the definition of working 
conditions. This type of clause has the effect of undermining the protection of 




It therefore seems important to take into account the way in which the law can be 
instrumentalized by the actors. In this perspective, reliance on the formal 
characteristics of the employment contract corresponds to a power struggle in which 
each party tries to protect its 'interest' by using the law and constructing equivalences 
to define interests that can be protected legally. In order to take into account the actors’ 
strategic actions, we therefore work on the threshold of the implicit agreement model 
underlying the employment relationship, with its cooperative commitment in the 
construction of a common good. 
2- The choice and construction of variables 
This section sets out the main elements that guided the choice and construction of 
variables, starting with the way of coding the information collected from 'contract' 
documents. For more details on the characteristics of our data base and especially on 
its representativeness, the reader is referred to the methodological annexe. 
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 Note that Article L 120-2 of the French Labour Code (following the 31 December 1992 Act 
on individual rights), authorizes the employer to limit individual and workers' rights only if 
such restrictions are in proportion to the objective and justified. For instance, clauses 
concerning mobility have to be consistent with the efficient functioning of the firm and 
respect the constraints of the employee's personal life to some degree. 
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The coding of information in the 'contracts' posed formidable problems of equivalence. 
The main difficulty stemmed from the fact that most of the documents collected are a 
hybrid of a contractual agreement and a written statement on 'employment conditions'. 
Not all the clauses in the 'contracts' are contractual by nature; often they are simply a 
'reminder' of the rules defined by the employee's collective status. Some correspond to 
the labour regulations defined by the employee's collective status; others may refer to 
advantages that the employer sees not as obligations but simply as pieces of 
information. Finally, certain clauses are not always licit (that is, not always validated a 
posteriori by the judicial system), which means that even 'illicit clauses' can have a 
threatening effect when incorporated into the agreement. We have not attempted to 
define an obligation or piece of information, a licit or illicit clause
11
; that is for the 
courts to decide. 
Based on our coding we constructed a large number of variables that did not exhaust 
all the information in the documents but were, in our opinion, relevant to our research 
question. Out of a total of seven main groups of variables (see Tables 1, 2 and 3), five 
played an active role in our analysis: variables relative to 'conditions of recruitment 
and breach of contract', to the 'definition of employment conditions', to the employee's 
subordination', to the 'protection of immaterial assets', and to the 'employee's 
individual accountability'. 
The other two groups were used for illustrative purposes. In particular, we constituted 
a group of variables enabling us to identify references in the 'contracts' to institutional 
devices and in particular to other documents with a legal value such as laws, collective 
agreements (industry- or company-wide) or company rules. We also took into account 
the reference to uses (trade-specific or company practices). These variables (see table 
2 on institutional devices) were distinguished according to whether the rules were 
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 From this point of view we share the sociological analysis of law proposed by such authors 
as Lascoumes and Serverin (1995), for whom it is important to analyse the way in which the 
law is mobilized by the actors, irrespective of the validity (in legal terms) of their actions or 
expectations. We nevertheless applied a minimum of legal knowledge, especially on 
employment contract law, to guide our coding and bear in mind the different legal resources 
available to actors for drawing up 'contracts'. 
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negotiated collectively or determined unilaterally by the employer, or whether they 
only concerned the determination of wages or other terms of the 'contract'. 
These additional variables helped to explain the absence of certain elements in the 
'contract', such as details on bonuses. The main difficulty of our analysis stemmed 
from the fact that certain written documents explicitly mentioned elements even if they 
were codified in other documents. The contract can thus act as a reminder of the 
conditions applicable to the employment relationship. We also lacked information on 
the context in which the 'contracts' were drafted. Such information would have enabled 
us to know if certain elements codified by collective agreements and mentioned in the 
'contract' really were contractualized by the parties – in which case they would be free 
to ignore changes in collective agreements. 
Finally, to account for the constraints imposed by the 'market', we took into account 
any mention made in the 'contracts' of 'customer satisfaction' or of anyone (patient, 
user, etc.) with whom the worker would have face-to-face contact in the course of his 
or her work. 
The other group of variables concerns the characteristics of jobs (level in the 
hierarchy, type, etc.) and firms (size, turnover, trade union presence, etc.) referred to in 
the 'contracts'. This information, provided in the annexe, helps to understand the 
composition of our base. 
The following sub-section presents the five main classes of active variables in the 
typology. Note that certain variables refer to the construction of synthetic indicators by 
addition of dummy variables (see recapitulative table 4 in annex). This makes it 
possible to measure intensities in relation to a particular dimension and, in some cases, 
to solve problems of distinction between information in 'contracts' with very similar 
meanings. 
2-1 Conditions of recruitment and breach of contract 
To account for the information relative to conditions of recruitment and breach of the 
employment contract, we constructed two types of variable. One indicator is designed 
to measure the intensity of guarantees sought by the employer during the recruitment 
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process (elements of proof of CV, aptitude tests, employee's availability, etc.) and on 
which the final signing of the contract depends. 
The other variable concerns the conditions of breach of the employment contract (trial 
period, length of notice, etc.). Note that even if this variable is considered to be an 
indicator of a policy of drafting 'contracts' essentially for informative purposes – since 
the details concerning breach of the employment contract are usually codified in 
collective agreements or legislation – the fact remains that they may also be mentioned 
by the employer to avoid certain disputes. 
2-2 Definition of employment conditions 
We constructed a series of variables to account for the way in which employers try or 
not to make their workers' employment conditions more flexible as regards the 
definition of the work content, working hours, workplace and salary. For each of these 
elements, we distinguished information in the 'contracts' through which employers 
commit themselves to 'stable' working conditions, from those through which they force 
their employees to agree to a certain degree of flexibility or to share risks inherent in 
the firm's economic activity and in the variations and changes in the organization of 
work to which they can lead (Morin, 2000). 
We were thus able to measure the flexibility of remuneration (variable bonuses, 
objectives clause), geographic flexibility (trips and mobility), temporal flexibility 
(flexi-time) and the flexibility of the job content (multi-skills and functional 
flexibility). The latter was completed by the construction of a variable to account for 
the mentioning of 'qualifications' only, without any additional definition of the content 
of the job. This gave weight to the qualifications of the job occupied by the employee, 
in relation to industry-wide collective labour agreements or to similar documents 
(company-wide agreements in large firms). 
2-3 The employee's subordination to the firm 
Another series of variables was designed to apprehend the degree of employees' 
subordination to the firm, by taking into account all the information that reduced their 
leeway in the choice of their work or, more generally, in the allocation of their 
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resources, as well as in the way of actually doing the work. Flexibility in the definition 
of tasks or functions, as mentioned above, can be considered as a sign of an 
employee's subordination (Simon, 1951). But for the employer another way of 
increasing subordination is by supervising the execution of the employee's work. It is 
in this perspective that we constructed an indicator by combining all the information 
concerning this type of supervision. In our coding we distinguished four types of 
normative device: hierarchical authority, evidenced by a clause stating that the 
employees is under the authority of a senior in the hierarchy; managerial instructions 
or norms; the obligation to work with certain 'tools and equipment'; and 'conduct and 
presentation'. 
We then took into account the presence or absence of an exclusivity or loyalty clause, 
to construct another indicator attesting to the intensity of the link of subordination. In 
this indicator we also integrated the obligation under which the employee is placed to 
have a place of abode close to the work place. This can be considered as another form 
of exclusivity that increases the employee's availability for the firm's benefit. This 
indicator can be interpreted as a way for the firm to develop the employee's loyalty but 
also to control, if not to optimize, the use of its material and immaterial assets. This 
restriction on the employee's freedom can be compensated for by fringe benefits. 
2-4 Protection of the firm's immaterial assets 
The following indicators concern even more direct protection of the firm's immaterial 
assets and the sharing of the associated rents, the constitution of which is based on the 
employees' work. We constructed three types of variable. The first indicator relates to 
the protection of human resources (forfeit for training
12
 or non-poaching clause). 
The second indicator relates to the protection of the firm's competitive advantage that 
involves an undertaking by the employees not to practise unfair competition other than 
by transferring intellectual property rights. We broke this indicator down into three 
sub-indicators. The first relates to the non-competition clause. The second relates to 
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 When a firm has financed an employee's training, the employee has to refund part of those 
costs if he or she resigns within a period currently limited to three years. 
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clauses in which the firm protects its clientele by granting itself an exclusive property 
right, in the course of execution of the contract or after the employment relationship 
has been terminated. The third measures the obligation of confidentiality (discretion, 
'restoration of goods and technical documents', researchers' authorization to publish). 
Finally, the last variable concerns clauses in terms of which the employee is obliged to 
grant back to the employer intellectual property rights: patents, copyrights, especially 
for the creation of software, and 'trademarks'
13
. 
In certain cases these different forms of appropriation of immaterial assets by the firm 
can be compensated for by paying the employee an individual bonus based, for 
example, on the number of patents registered, or financial compensation as in the case 
of the non-competition clause. 
2-5 Employee's individual accountability 
As noted above, one way of making employees individually accountable is by 
stipulating that a part of their salary depends on individual performance. We 
distinguished other forms by constructing an indicator grouping together different 
clauses concerning accountability or 'obligation of means'. We also included clauses in 
the 'contract' that defined 'misconduct' leading to dismissal for individual reasons or to 
the suspension of the employment contract. Based on this indicator of the 'employee's 
individual accountability', we tried to identify all clauses, other than those directly 
related to individual remuneration, that defined the conditions of sanctions for 
misconduct or inefficiency in which the employee's individual accountability was 
concerned. Apart from the incentive dimension of these clauses, they can also be 
interpreted as systematic anticipation by the employer of disputes concerning the 
employee's work. In this way the firm is assured of the outcome of dispute or trials in 
which it may have to justify its decision
14
. 
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 This obligation, based on legal measures (concerning employees' innovation), enables the 
employer to appropriate innovations even if the employee participated in their creation. 
14
 Note, however, that in French law no employment contract clause can validly stipulate that 
any particular circumstance may constitute a cause for dismissal. This is a controversial point 
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The five dimensions distinguished above are not disconnected. The clause concerning 
flexibility of the job content can be considered as a means of increasing the employee's 
subordination. Moreover, every variable can be related to the others within the same or 
other dimensions. Thus, certain forms of remuneration granted on an individual basis 
can compensate for exclusive rights that the firm grants itself concerning the use of 
certain immaterial resources. In this case, the firm simply shares the rent generated by 
these assets but maintains control over their use. In general, the objective of our 
statistic typology is to highlight these relations between the variables. 
3- Presentation of the typology 
Based on the variables presented above, we have elaborated a typology and retained a 
partition into four classes (see annex). The classes are presented here by increasing 
order of complexity of the 'contractual structure', in the sense of the multiplication of 
guarantees sought, especially by the employer, on the different aspects of the 
employment relationship. 
Class 1: stability of employment conditions and employment relationship defined by 
collective status 
(112 contracts) 
This class that groups together over a third of the 'contracts' in our data base is 
characterized by the extreme weakness of 'contractual guarantees' sought by the 
employer, especially regarding the flexibility of working conditions. By contrast, the 
invariability of working hours is prevalent, as are, although to a lesser degree, 
geographic stability and the payment of set bonuses (especially an extra month's 
salary). It is in this class that the job occupied by the employee is usually defined in 
terms of the qualification as defined by the collective status, and in which little 
mention is made of standards framing the execution of work. The protection of the 
firm's immaterial assets as well as the individualization of the employment relationship 
are also minimal here. 
                                                                                                                                                        
among French jurists who defend the free determination of the content of contracts 
(Couturier, 2004). 
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It is in this configuration that reference to a status governing the working relationship 
is probably the most relevant. This is confirmed by the reference, more often than on 
average (0.30 against 0.24 for the complete sample), to the industry-wide collective 
labour agreement with regard to remuneration. Moreover, the brevity of the document 
may explain the fact that the collective agreement is seldom mentioned (1.84 against 
2.36 for the complete sample), since the 'contract' refers to it only once but for all the 
employment conditions. Note that the level of union membership is high and that this 
can be linked to the low turnover reported and the strong over-representation of large 
public-sector firms that still offer employees a status (13% against 7% for the 
complete sample). 
But the weakness of the 'contractual structure' may also be explained by the fact that it 
is in this class that the highest number of documents drafted in the form of a letter of 
appointment is found (30% against 18% for the complete sample), and the highest 
number of fixed-term contracts. Considering that these two forms of document are 
unrelated, over half of this class contains documents in which the employer's attempt 
to secure guarantees is necessarily limited. In the case of letters of appointment this is 
because the document has been drafted with less attention to detail, and a number of 
aspects, especially concerning the execution of the work and breach of contract, are 
not mentioned. In the case of fixed-term contracts, the limited duration of the 
employment relationship is not conducive to the incorporation of clauses of flexibility 
and protection of immaterial assets, with the exception of IP rights. The structure of 
the remuneration is also very straightforward. Finally, the regulation of its formalism 
and content by French law (compulsory clauses) puts this class close to the statutory 
form. 
Class 2: moderate flexibility and significance of the 'collective status' 
(73 contracts) 
Although characterized by a certain degree of weakness of the 'contractual structure', 
this class differs from the preceding one in that employment conditions are more 
flexible, especially regarding working hours and payment of bonuses for collective 
performance, and fewer exclusivity constraints weigh on the employees. The 
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workplace is also mentioned less often, but without this being synonymous with a high 
level of geographic mobility. On the other hand, it is also in this class that the 
qualification of the job is less often accompanied by an explicit definition of its 
content, and that the guarantees concerning recruitment and the protection of 
immaterial assets are weaker. 
Insert 1 
With the contracts in this class we can talk of an employment relationship in which the 
employees commit themselves to some degree of flexibility of working conditions. 
This is connected to the high number of part-time contracts
15
 (44% against 25% for the 
complete sample) and references to company agreements, especially regarding 
remuneration and working hours (0.55 against 0.42 for the complete sample). This 
predominance of part-time contracts also explains the over-representation of labourers 
(15% against 10%), women (42% against 37%) and the obligation to be on call and to 
work unusual hours (25% against 14%). All these are characteristic of jobs in the 
commercial sector which is strongly represented in this class (23% against 12%). They 
are mostly 'standard' jobs, in the sense of requiring few competencies and little 
commitment to the employment relationship. The weakness of recruitment guarantees 
(1.22 against 1.6) and protection of immaterial assets confirms this. It is in this class 
that the protection of the firm's competitive advantage is weakest, whether it concerns 
the protection of its clientele or confidentiality obligations, especially the obligation of 
discretion (42% against 59%) and 'restoration of goods and technical documents' in 
case of termination of the employment relationship (10% against 26%). 
Note, however, that in the case of a division into six classes, one needs to distinguish a 
sub-group of about 20 contracts, mostly full-time (82%) and relative to managerial 
staff (54%) working in very large firms (75%) in which temporal flexibility is related 
to the set rate system. The structure of remuneration is particularly rich here since it 
                                                 
15
 It can also be linked to the weakness of the obligation of exclusivity, for in the case of part-
time contracts this type of clause is hardly acceptable, especially since a ruling by the 
Chambre social of the Cour de cassation (the labour section of the appeal court) on 11 July 
2000. 
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includes fixed bonuses, additional compensation for individual and collective 
performance, and various fringe benefits. 
More generally, the definition of employment conditions is related more to a 
negotiated 'collective status' than to rules defined by the employer. We have already 
highlighted the importance of company-wide collective agreements, but the impact of 
the collective agreement is also relatively strong as regards qualification, remuneration 
and conditions of breach of the employment contract. The value of our synthetic 
indicator of reference to the collective agreement (GCCOL) is 1.32 against 1.27 for the 
whole sample. Reference to 'professional uses' is also frequent (0.36 against 0.28). On 
the other hand, it is in this class that the indicator measuring the reference to 'company 
rules' (REGENT) is weakest (1.14 against 1.35). 
Class 3: generalized flexibility and employee's subordination to the employer's 
powers 
(73 contracts) 
The contracts in this class are characterized by a high level of flexibility of working 
hours and work content. The flexibility of working hours also includes the obligation 
to do overtime (65.5% against 26.5%) and to work unusual hours (38% against 15%). 
Although the content of the work is defined, this clarification is intended to ensure 
employee versatility (24% against 10%) and does not eliminate the constraint of 
functional flexibility (45% against 21%). 
The content of the 'contract' is most often marked by systematic individual 
accountability. In particular, it is this class that contains most references to dismissal 
for serious misconduct (29% against 21%), 'individual accountability clauses' (24% 
against 14%) and 'obligations of means' (19% against 7%). This 'forced 
contractualization' of employees' commitment to their work goes hand in hand with 
close supervision of its execution – as attested by the highly frequent presence of all 
the normative devices distinguished above, especially obligations in terms of 'conduct 
and presentation' (31% against 8%). The same wish to control employees' work is 
found in frequent reference to the number of days worked (paid holidays, illness, 
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absences) (1.86 against 0.85). This tight control of employees' performance is related 
to the large number of safeguards required by employers (1.98 against 1.6). The quasi-
systematic mention made of breach of the employment relationship (2.9 against 2.2), 
whether it concerns resignation/dismissal or a trial period, may be a sign that the 
employment relationship can be terminated at any point and that the employer 
anticipates disputes in this respect. 
Finally, with the exception of confidentiality obligations, especially discretion, the 
indicators of protection of the firm's immaterial assets have very low values, as in the 
preceding two classes. 
Insert tables 2 and 3 
Compared to the preceding two classes, all these characteristics attest to the fact that 
the employers want more guarantees and use the formal means of the 'contract' to 
ensure highly flexible working conditions, close control of the employee's work and 
performance and, subsequently, the possibility of terminating the employment 
relationship at any stage. In this configuration, which corresponds closely to the 
'hierarchical authority model', collective agreements
16
 play a relatively small part in 
the definition of employment conditions (GCCOL=1.17 and GACENT=0.33 against 
1.27 and 0.42 respectively). These are defined primarily by rules set by the employer 
(1.53 against 1.35), as attested by very frequent reference to company rules (0.66 
against 0.54), a code of conduct (0.16 against 0.11) and company customs (47% 
against 40%). 
The large number of flexibility clauses, especially as regards the definition of the job 
content and working hours, is related to the high number of part-time contracts (50%). 
Greater flexibility of job content, especially functional flexibility, differentiates this 
class from the preceding one. This flexibility enhances the employer's powers to define 
the content of the job. As regards working hours, part-time labour regulations (Art. 
                                                 
16
 The fact that there is a high number of references to the industry-wide collective agreement 
(3.34 against 2.36) relates more to the length of the 'contract' document and to its degree of 
precision than to an employment relationship defined primarily by the collective agreement. 
The 'contract' mentions all the sources of the definition of the employment relationship with 
precision, which is a way of highlighting the role of the law. 
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214.3 of the Labour Code, 20 December 1993 Act) stipulate that employers have 
obligations of form and, in particular, have to introduce a clause providing for the 
conditions of changes to the distribution of working hours. 
In general, this wish for flexibility and tight control of work is consistent with the 
characteristics of the firms in this class that are more often SMEs (33% against 25%) 
than in the other classes, have a relatively high turnover (33% against 24%) and have a 
very low level of trade unionism (28% against 45%). It is not surprising that the 'hotel 
and catering' and 'road transport' sectors are strongly over-represented in this 
typological class (0.19 and 0.16, against 0.07 in both sectors)
17
. 
In this configuration marked by a systematic reduction of the costs of managing 
manpower, a systematic sharing of the risks inherent in the firm's business, and 
employees with very little negotiating power, we can say that the firm instrumentalizes 
the 'contract'. In this way it reinforces either its supervisory power by introducing 
clauses of flexibility (except when compelled by the law), or its disciplinary power by 
systematically making employees individually accountable. A comparison of some of 
these 'contracts' with the associated company rules (French Règlement Intérieur) 
shows that the former simply copy the clauses of the latter. With this type of 
formulation the employer acts as if the employee had made a contractual commitment, 
whereas the employee is simply obliged, by law, to comply with the company rules. 
This suggests that certain 'clauses' may be considered illicit by the court, although that 
does not reduce their threatening effect before the dispute has been declared. Finally, 
the extensive mobilization of the law is also found in the very frequent reference made 
to legislative texts (84% against 61%). 
Class 4: Protection of immaterial assets and contracts negotiated by professionals 
                                                 
17
 The study by Pignoni and Zuary (2003) shows that it is service activities with a high rate of 
manpower utilization that most often use dismissal for individual reasons. This corresponds to 
both these two sectors. Moreover, apart from the fact that in our sample it is the 'contracts' of 
these sectors that most often mention 'dismissal for serious misconduct', another motive of 
individual dismissal can consist in the employee's refusal to agree to an amendment in these 
'employment conditions'. Since these are sectors tightly constrained by the need for flexibility, 
we can assume that this type of motive for individual dismissal is also frequent. 
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(66 contracts) 
The last typological class, consisting of the 'contracts' with the most information, is 
characterized by firms that systematically seek to guarantee protection of their 
immaterial assets (human resources, clientele and technological assets), geographic 
mobility and exclusive access to their employees' work. Working hours are usually 
defined on a set basis. The fact that bonuses based on individual performance are most 
frequent in this class can be related to the systematic request for guarantees at 
recruitment, as regards both the employees' qualities and the fact that they are not 
committed to another employer. 
It is in this configuration that reference to the contract in the definition of the terms of 
the employment relationship is probably the most relevant, due to the real bargaining 
power that highly-skilled employees have. The 'managerial' group is highly over-
represented in this class (0.76 against 0.42). We can assume that it is because these 
professionals can leave the firm and set up on their own at any stage that employers 
choose to multiply contractual guarantees designed to protect the firm's immaterial 
assets or to enhance these employees' commitment to the firm. Note that 'contracts' in 
this class are the only ones to introduce clauses of forfeit for training and non-
poaching after breach of the employment contract. 
This commitment that reduces employees' freedom can nevertheless be compensated 
for by payment of a non-competition indemnity (29% against 6%) and individual 
performance bonuses (0.92 against 0.36). The granting of stock-options is a clear 
illustration. But individualized remuneration, associated with enhanced individual 
accountability (0.84 against 0.53), is also intended to reinforce employees' 
commitment and to ensure that they share the firm's risks. The relatively high level of 
collective bonuses (0.14 against 0.12) and of the demand for flexibility in the job 
content (0.54 against 0.39) and geographic flexibility (1.56 against 0.83) have the 
same objective. 
This commitment to the employment relationship is confirmed by the fact that the 
'contracts' in this class are full-time (94%) unlimited-term (95%) contracts with a very 
strong requirement to do business trips in the framework of outside assignments (79% 
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against 35%). It is in this class that employment contracts referring to the 'consultancy 
firms' collective agreement are over-represented the most (0.45 against 0.14)
18
. Even if 
these professionals are free to organize their time, the delivery of services to clients 
can explain why the 'contract' refers explicitly to all the normative devices framing the 
execution of their work, with the exception of obligations concerning 'conduct and 
presentation'. It is as if the employer wanted to remind the employee who is boss, 
although the latter is strongly encouraged to act autonomously and to meet 
customers'/clients' needs. It is in this class that the reference to 'customers'/'clients' is 
most frequent (3.33 against 1.13), without this being entirely related to the length of 
the 'contract'. 
In this employment relationship, on the boundary between salaried work and a self-
employed status, the multiplication of guarantees leads to a formal reduction of the 
employees' freedom (Supiot, 1999). This applies to the execution of their work and the 
possibility of working for another employer, during the employment relationship or 
after its termination. Likewise, reference to company rules is frequent (REGENT=1.61 
against 1.35) in employment conditions, although extensive regulation on a profession-
wide basis could be expected. Such regulation is found if we confine ourselves to the 
indicator of reference to the industry-wide collective agreement that reaches its highest 
level in this class (GCCOL=1.36 against 1.27), or to the frequency of reference to 
professional customs (30% against 28%), but higher levels could have been expected. 
This can probably be related to the low level of trade union representation in firms in 
this class (0.35 against 0.45). 
We can therefore conclude that there is a multiplicity of institutional devices framing 
the employment relationship, even if company rules and market constraints play a key 
role. It is this presence of the market constraint that, in this configuration, makes the 
                                                 
18
 The 'Insurance and other financial activities' sector is over-represented (8% against 4%). 
This can be related to the fact that some classes of employees in this sector participate 
actively in the constitution of immaterial assets (human assets, financial engineering and 
clientele) that can be deployed in other firms. See the thesis by O. Godechot (2004) on 
financial traders who constitute an extreme example. Because of their difficulties in 
incorporating clauses to protect immaterial assets in the employment 'contract', firms obtain 
employee's loyalty by paying sometimes exorbitant bonuses. 
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employment relationship similar to out-contracting with a self-employed worker. In 
these relationships individual performance objectives can be negotiated (33% against 
11%), as can certain particular advantages if the employee is in a position of strength. 
It is also this market constraint that can explain the frequency of clauses in the 
'contract' concerning the conditions of breach of the employment contract (2.42 against 
2.23), especially the notice period (64% against 40%). This suggests that the employer 
anticipates a dispute in case of the employee's resignation. Finally, even if the 'market 
model' seems to predominate in regulating the employment relationship, causing the 
parties to rely on the formalism of the contract to protect their interests, the fact 
remains that, as in the preceding class, the search for the employee's flexibility and 
accountability can be interpreted as a form of instrumentalization of the law for the 
benefit of the employer's decision-making power and legal security. But if so that 
instrumentalization is weak since the employee's flexibility and individual 
accountability in the case of the 'market model' is far more legitimate. 
4- Discussion of the results 
To sum up, this division into four classes serves to account not only for the plurality of 
the employment relationship, in the usual sense of the type of labour relationship or 
the way of managing manpower, but also for the objectives of the parties in that 
relationship, and especially the employer, when they draw up a written document with 
legal formalism (see the graphic representation of the typology). When it comes to 
highlighting a plurality of employment relations our analysis is limited due to the 
relatively small size of the sample and the nature of the data and coding. The absence 
of clauses on certain employment conditions in the written document analysed does 
not mean that they are not applied in practice and codified in the collective status that 
applies to that employee. In this respect our indicators for measuring references to 
collective agreements are fragile because modes of drafting 'contracts' can be very 
different. At the same time the data in our possession do not enable us to apprehend 
the particular advantages that can be negotiated by employees on an individual basis. 
Likewise, the coding work and variables selected for the typology do not make it 
possible systematically to identify all the clauses used by employers to reserve for 
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themselves the unilateral right to amend the employment conditions, or to 
'contractualize' their disciplinary power. It is therefore necessary to have a more 
detailed coding and a more complex typology if the parties' use of the law is to be 
understood more fully. 
But apart from these limits, our typology that contrasts different employment 
relationships is similar to those compiled from data better suited to this type of 
exercise
19
. It is on the second point concerning use of the law that our analysis based 
of 'contract' texts is the most enriching. Although we cannot directly grasp the trade-
offs between different legal types of employment contract (fixed-term or unlimited-
term contract, part-time work, etc.), which is a way of examining the uses of labour 
law, our study makes it possible to analyse these uses in a more elementary way by 
focusing on the nature of the guarantees sought at the stage of drafting the 
'employment contract'. Reforms designed to increase the formalism of the unlimited-
term contract can thus be illuminated. 
Briefly, the first two classes relate to an employment relationship governed primarily 
by a collective status over which the employee and employer have little control. It is 
not a real employment contract in the sense of negotiation of an inter-individual 
agreement, and the parties are fully aware of this. From the point of view of use of the 
law, it is the reference to the collective status that predominates as the main institution 
in the employment relationship. The written document, as proof of the act of 
recruitment, is essentially a tool for informing employees of their main conditions of 
employment, rather than a contractual device oriented towards inter-individual 
negotiation. This informative purpose does not mean that no dispute is anticipated and 
that the written document offers no legal guarantee, but that the guarantee concerns 
only the main elements of the 'employment contract' and is provided by collective 
agreements. 
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 For example, the typology constructed by H. Petit (2003) with data from the 1999 REPONSE survey made it 
possible to distinguish the 'renovated internal market', the 'cost management' method based on flexibility (two 
types were distinguished) and ‘professionalized management by projects'. Beffa et ali. (1999) use monographic 
data to propose a typology that distinguishes 'multi-skills stability', 'market flexibility' and the 'occupation'. These 
correspond to the classes of our typology, except for the first class in which most of the contracts relate to a 
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The second class differs from the first only in so far as it introduces clauses of 
flexibility – albeit modestly – into the employment conditions. These differences are 
also largely due to the form and type of 'contract' ('letter of appointment'/'employment 
contract', unlimited-term/fixed-term contract, full/part-time). In recent years there has 
been an increase in the 'status model' due to decentralization of collective bargaining 
and more flexible forms of organization that require more commitment by employees 
in their work. The company-wide collective agreements signed in accordance with the 
Aubry laws of 1998 and 2000 on a 35-hour working week provide a clear illustration 
(Pelisse, 2004). 
The common denominator of the other two classes of 'contract' is the multiplication of 
guarantees sought and, in particular, reliance on the formalism of the contract. 
Although it is difficult to distinguish a priori between contractualized elements and 
informative clauses, it seems that the latter are frequent and more evident than in the 
preceding two classes. We can assume that this informative objective has a different 
meaning in a configuration of manpower management characterized by a high staff 
turnover and low union membership, and where the rules defined unilaterally by the 
employer play a relatively important part compared to the negotiated collective status, 
judging by our indicators. These indicators need to be used with caution, however, and 
our data on turnover and union presence are insufficient. 
Apart from the limits inherent in our data, we can posit that in this configuration it is 
as if the document signed at the time of recruitment were designed to inform 
employees without delay of their rights and duties, in the absence of progressive 
integration into a work collective during which the company rules were traditionally 
made known. The short duration of the employment relationship, associated with the 
differentiation of working conditions in time and space, seem to make this informative 
device even more necessary. It appears to attest to a form of individualization of the 
working relationship. The fragmentation of work places and times seems to reduce 
employees' capacity to organize and to be represented, and thus to be able to create 
norms and devices to defend their rights, typical of a collective. In this configuration, 
the content of the 'employment contract' seems to be the only thing that they can rely 
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on, without always being able to master the subtleties of interpretation of certain 
clauses. The low cost of drawing up written documents (which are usually highly 
standardized; see annexe) and reproducing them, owing to new information 
technologies, tends to increase the use of writing to replace oral forms of 
communication. 
In general, this increasing use of writing for informative purposes is connected to the 
legal and collective agreement obligations that employers have to inform their 
employees of their employment conditions. Moreover, it has become mandatory to put 
certain clauses into writing (e.g. length of trial period, non-competition, geographic 
mobility), even if these conditions are codified in industry-wide collective agreements 
(Couturier, 2004). It is likewise compulsory to include in the 'contract' a clause 
concerning changes in the distribution of working hours in the case of part-time 
contracts. Similar obligations apply to the form of fixed-term contracts or other 
specific types of contract. The law and collective agreements therefore constitute a 
factor that can increase the use of formal contracts to observe employees' individual 
rights to information. But actors within firms participate to a large degree and it is no 
coincidence that written documents tend to contain far more in a configuration where 
employees' protection is based less on collective procedures. 
Apart from these similarities, the third and fourth classes have differences. The third 
differs from the fourth in that functional and temporal flexibility rather than 
geographic flexibility are sought, and in that the employment relationship is 
individualized via tight control of the employee's work rather than remuneration of 
individual performance. In this third class, it is the 'hierarchical authority model' that 
predominates in the definition of the employment relationship. The employer's 
hierarchical authority is strongly asserted in the 'contract' through the multiplication of 
references to its powers regarding management, definition of employment and 
working conditions, and discipline. Certain clauses can be considered as a form of 
contractualization of the employer's disciplinary power, thus facilitating the dismissal 
of an employee who proves to be unsatisfactory, for instance by failing to meet the 
objectives defined in the contract. It appears that when this form of 'contractualization' 
of the employer's decision-making power undermines the employee protection usually 
 30 
offered by French labour laws – in so far as the law aims precisely to limit that 
decision-making power –, the result is a mode of instrumentalization of the law that 
enables the firm to guarantee its legal security. In this perspective, the 'hierarchical 
authority model' loses all its legitimacy and the employment relationship tilts over into 
a pure power struggle in which the employee has few advantages. The standard-terms 
agreement appears to relate to the forced acceptance, by the economically weak party, 
of the proposals advanced by the stronger party. 
In the last class, if the employer's decision-making powers are referred to, a margin for 
negotiation seems to be left to the employees, especially when they are in a favourable 
position in the labour market. The employer's wish for guarantees to protect the firm's 
immaterial assets or to confirm its power to define the employment conditions can be 
compensated for. For instance, employees can obtain individual bonuses or fringe 
benefits, depending on their ability to negotiate and to play on the threat of 
competition. It is in this configuration that the market model seems to be the most 
prevalent and that the contract appears to allow the objectives of individualization and 
adaptation, typical of the efficiency of market mechanisms, to be met. The mutual 
reliance on formal guarantees increases when the stakes are high, in the sense of losses 
that either of the two parties can sustain due to an inadequate contract. This more 
complete form of contractualization does nevertheless involve the risk of being 
inappropriate if the relationship lasts, due to the possible increase in the specificity of 
the assets underlying the transaction (Williamson, 1985). The appearance of 




Finally, from a point of view of time, the latter two classes are over-represented in the 
period 2000-2004, whereas the first class is over-represented in the period 1970-1992 
(see Table 3). This suggests that the formalism of contracts has increased in recent 
years, a trend that can be related to the evolution of French labour law and to 
economic factors that need to be examined. In general, all the 'flexibility' clauses 
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 In their research on ‘technical consultants, engineering consultants and consulting firm in NTIC’, Fondeur and 
Sauviat (2002) point out the difficulties to set up collectives rules within such an industry characterized by a high 
staff turnover. 
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increased during the period under consideration. But to assess this situation 
representative data would be required, which presents a real problem, and changes in 
legal precedents would need to be identified. 
To conclude, we have established that there is wide diversity in practices in the 
drafting of 'employment contracts', connected to the plurality of employment relations 
and uses of the law. This attests to the flexibility of French labour law but also to its 
evolution towards a form of protection for employees based more on their individual 
rights granted by law, regarding information and amendment of employment 
conditions, than on collective procedures. Although this helps to strengthen the 
representation of the contract in governance of employment relations, our observations 
show that the contractual framework and the legal guarantees that it offers are still 
used relatively infrequently and concern certain types of employment relationship, in 
particular the ‘contracts’ belonging to class fourth of our typology. In most cases 
documents written and signed by the parties are intended to clarify employment 
conditions determined elsewhere, either by collective negotiation or unilaterally, by 
the employer. 
From this point of view an analogy can be drawn with the British case, even if 
collective bargaining has declined more in the UK (Brown et ali., 1998). But despite 
its strength in France, collective bargaining clearly plays a part in individualizing the 
employment relationship and organizing its flexibility, as attested by company-wide 
agreements on working hours (Pelisse, 2004) or on salaries and individual 
competencies (Jobert, 1999). 
In this configuration, can real benefits be expected from reform of the 'employment 
contract' based on more formalism that enhances the role of contractual mechanisms? 
In our opinion the risk is that this would favour the most standard employment 
relationships and certain forms of instrumentalization of the law by employers, which 
would not be to the employees' advantage as regards their legal security. It seems 
reasonable to assume that more sophisticated contracts would have only a limited 
effect on economic cooperation and would not be enough to compensate for the 
 32 
insufficiency of occupational regulatory devices allowing for an institutionalization of 
employment relationships (Supiot, 1999). 
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Guarantees in matter of 
recruitment 






















Definition of employment conditions 
Content of the job 
Qualification only**  
Flexibility 
Time of working hours 
Invariable time  
Temporal flexibility 
Set basis  






Individual variable bonuses 
Collective variable bonuses 






















































































The employee’s subordination to the firm 
Normative devices of work monitoring 




















Respect of clientele 
Confidentiality 

















































*: ‘1.24’ means that the average value of the indicator of ‘guarantees in matter of recruitment’ is 1.24 for all the contracts belonging to the 
class 1. 
** : italic variables correspond to dummy variables. We give the mean with a value between 0 and 1. 
 38 













Number of pages 
The written document is designed  
as an « employment contract »  


























Qualification (issued from collective agreements)  0.78 0.74 0.86 0.71 0.83 
Determination of wages (certain elements of remuneration) in 
reference to 
Industry collective agreements  
Company-wide collective agreements  


























Work monitoring devices 
Hierarchical authority  
Managerial norms  
‘tools and equipments’  




























NBCC (number of references in the ‘contract’) 
GCCOL(qualification+wage+breach+trial period) 
Company-wide 
GACENT (wage and other elements) 






































Ethic code of conduct  
Company uses  


























Reference to law or equivalent 0.61 0.43 0.59 0.84 0.72 
‘Customers satisfaction’ 1.13 0.25 0.34 1.34 3.33 
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Table 3: Characteristics of jobs by typological class (%) 
 
 













































































Firm’s size  
VSE (<100) 













































































agreement or sector 
Any collective agreement 







Flying transports, ground staff 
Banks 
Assurances and other financial act. 


















































































































Methodological and statistical annexe 
Our data base is constituted of 309 'employment contracts' from over 200 firms in 
different sectors of activity. The present annexe contains details on the method used to 
collect contracts, the question of representativeness of the data base and that of the 
'formalism' of the contract which poses a problem of equivalence of the documents in 
the base, and the characteristics of jobs and firms. Finally, we give some information 
concerning the construction of our statistical typology. The table 4 recapitulates the 
construction of the variables in our typological analysis and, in particular, the 
construction of synthetic indicators. Table 5 gives the contribution of each variable for 
each typological class.  
Collection methods 
These documents were drawn from six main sources. Initially our objective was to 
collect 'employment contracts' from representatives of firms in order to obtain precise 
information on the environment of the contract: the company's HR management policy 
and its practices in drawing up contracts. However, this was such an unwieldy task that 
we decided to diversify our sources (see table), so that 'contracts' collected directly 
from employers finally accounted for only 24.6% of the sample. Contracts obtained 
from a legal firm (26.5%) or trade unions (10.7%) may have introduced a bias since 
they were taken from case files and therefore concerned disputes. Yet very few 
disputes directly concern contractual commitments as such, and most often concern 
only one clause. The collection of 'contracts' from employees (23.0%) via networks of 
friends and family helped to expand the data base, as did contracts obtained from the 
labour inspection office (15.2%), most of which corresponded to part-time contracts in 
the framework of the government measure to reduce social charges by 30% – a 
measure cancelled by the so-called Aubry law on the 35-hour working week, passed in 
2000. 
Note that the different nature of these sources introduces no bias into the sample. This 
was checked by means of the various indicators used in our analysis. 
Representativeness of the data base 
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The question of representativeness of the data base is tricky and remains important if 
we reason in terms of an evolution over the three periods distinguished: 1970-1992 
(14%), 1993-1999 (33%) and 2000-2004 (53%). The typology serves to identify links 
between the variables ('contractual structure'). The variables of job characterization 
serve as an illustration. In this type of contractual structure we can simply say that a 
particular type of job, firm or sector is essentially absent or present. 
To revert to the different phases, the year 1993 was chosen as a threshold because it 
corresponded to the entry into application of the 13 October 1991 European directive 
relative to 'the employer's obligation to inform the worker of conditions applicable to 
the contract or to the employment relationship'. The late eighties and early nineties 
also witnessed a new legal precedent concerning the amendment of the employment 
contract, that reinforced the intangibility of the contract, in particular. The other 
milestone chosen was the year 2000 which corresponds to the second Aubry law on 
the 35-hour working week. As our different observations show (especially interviews 
with HR managers), not only did collective negotiation around reduced working time 
result in amendments to the employment contract, those amendments also led to an 
increase in unlimited-term contracts, especially by introducing standard clauses 
corresponding to the working times opted for by the employee. 
This increase in unlimited-term contracts in the past ten years, in a country where 
labour legislation imposes no constraints in this respect, explains why the latter two 
phases in our sample are over-represented. But this notion of representativeness is 
problematical when we have no precise data on the parent group, that is, all employees 
who signed a document at the time of their recruitment, for each period. Consequently, 
we give only a few indications concerning representativeness, based on the 
characteristics of jobs and firms in our base. 
Formalism of the contract 
The form of the document poses another problem of equivalence. Written documents 
are distinguished in terms of whether they are explicitly drafted as 'contracts' or are 
rather in the form of a letter of appointment. In the latter case, the document is usually 
less detailed because it concentrates more on the time of the recruitment, mentioning 
 42 
the main elements of the 'contract', and less on breach of the contract and management 
of the post-contract stage. 
We did not take into account the fact of the 'contract' having a standardized form or 
not. Most of these documents are standard contracts and usually refer to a class of 
employee. Some are written in a more personalized mode that attests to the negotiation 
of certain clauses or particular advantages, but that remains an exception. We can 
conclude that, in most cases, the cost of drawing up a contract is relatively low once 
the investment has been made in drafting a standard contract or standard clauses. More 
and more firms use software for drafting contracts. 
We distinguished unlimited-term contracts from particular contracts and especially 
fixed-term contracts, for which certain very precise legal constraints exist in French 
law as far as their form is concerned. In the latter case, apart from the fact that this 
type of contract relates to short-term commitments, it seems that anticipated inspection 
by government or judicial authorities ('requalification in unlimited-term contract') can 
prompt employers to comply with labour legislation more readily than they would 
otherwise have done. The same applies to part-time contracts. 
It is because the different types of contract correspond to different types of constraint 
and to manpower management choices that we tried to be 'representative' in this 
respect throughout the entire sample – at least to give some validity to the frequency of 
the different types of clause or information. For instance, 16% of the 'contracts' in the 
data base are fixed-term contracts and 25% are part-time contracts, which is close to 
the national mean over the past few years in the case of the former (11% in 2000, 
INSEE employment survey), and slightly over-represented in the case of the latter 
(reportedly around 17%). 
We constructed a quantitative variable to account for the size of the written document 
based on the number of pages. This is a way of taking into consideration the role that 
the employer wants the written document to play, although we did not distinguish 
clauses that which could correspond to a contractual commitment binding the two 
parties, and those that could be considered as elements of information. This distinction 
is, moreover, problematical and the cause of many legal disputes, especially regarding 
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amendments to the employment contract (Pélissier, 2004). Note that the number of 
pages is calculated by taking into account only the annexes to which the body of the 
'contract' explicitly refers. 
The characteristics of jobs and firms 
Due to the relative weakness of our sample and the fact that we have little information 
on the environment of certain contracts, we have selected only a small number of 
elements to characterize jobs (see Table 3). 
Apart from the legal nature of the contract (fixed-term or unlimited), we distinguish 
jobs in terms of whether they are full- or part-time, the hierarchical class in the sense 
of collective agreements (workers/ETAM
21
/’managers’) and the type 
(male/female/doesn't know). 
In the same perspective, the share of contracts signed by 'managers', in the sense of 
industry-wide collective agreements, is most probably over-represented (42%). In the 
absence of figures on the parent group as regards this mode of classification, this 
figure can be related to the share of the 'managers and professionals' in the total 
working population (excluding farmers and artisans), which was around 15% in 1999 
(last population census). But it seems that it is the occupational class in which the 
drafting of contracts is the most frequent. A recent study on trials shows that 85% of 
managers’ contracts are written (Fontaine, 2003). 
Information on firms concerns the size of the firm (<100, between 100 and 500, >500), 
the impact or not of staff turnover on the job class considered, and the presence or not 
of union membership. For the latter two variables, three modalities were chosen, the 
last of which referred to absences of answers (‘doesn’t know’). 
We constructed a variable enabling us to characterize the collective agreement to 
which the employment contract corresponded. In the case where there were too few 
employees we formed groups in relation to a business sector. A total of 13 modalities 
were selected, one of which corresponded to jobs not governed by any collective 
                                                 
21
 "employés, techniciens, agents de maîtrise" : professional category of clerical workers, 
technicians and supervisory staff. 
 44 
agreement. Another corresponded to contracts relative to jobs in large public-sector 
corporations. Among the conventions that were well-represented was the one 
applicable to staff of 'technical consultants, engineering consultants and consulting 
firms', the collective agreement of the 'Parisian UIMM', banks and 'hotels-restaurants'. 
The other modalities represent sectors (agri-food, chemicals, trade and especially food 
trade). 
Typology and construction of synthetic variables 
For constructing the typology, we used the hierarchical ascending classification 
technique. This technique is based on the criterion of variance (CAHQUAL procedure 
of the SAS software). We have retained a four classes partition for the sake of clarity 
of the presentation. Note that this partition into four classes substantially increases the 
intra-class variance, compared to the partition into six classes (from 71% to 77% of the 
share of total variance). We furthermore chose highly synthetic classes, that is, 
constructed by several variables and not only one, which was the case of two classes in 
the more disaggregated partition. 
In table 4, we give the way we have elaborated synthetic indicators by adding dummy 
variables. In table 5 we give, for all active variables, the signed decomposition of 
RHO2; that means the distance between the centre of classes and the gravity centre of 
the cloud. That gives some indication of the contribution of each active variable to the 
construction of the four classes. Note that we have added four dummy variables: 
QUAL1 (mention of the employment qualification without any additional definition of 
the content of the job), LIEU1 (explicit mention of the workplace without any clause 
of mobility), DUREW1 (invariable time of working hours) and FORFH1 (working 
hours defined on a set basis). All in all, we have retained 22 actives variables for 
constructing the typology. 
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Table 4: Active variables representing synthetic indicators 
Variables Name Definition Mean 








CV information and modification 
Elements of proof of CV 
Medical and aptitude tests 















Conditions of breach of contract (dismissal and quit, except notices) 
Mention of length of notice 
Mention of trial period 
































Flexibility of work hours 
Extra hours obligation  










Mention of paid holydays 
Mention relative to illness an maternity 










Extra month’s salary or equivalent 
Seniority bonuses 
































The employee is placed under the authority of a supervisor  
Obligation for the employee to follow managerial norms 
Obligation to work with certain tools, equipment or product  






















Forfeit for training clause 



















Compagny’s right to allocate the clientele 









Obligation of discretion (trade secret) 
Restoration of goods and technical documents 










In matter of patent 
In matter of copyrights (software) 












Obligation to contract an insurance for civil liability 
Other clauses of liability 
Obligation of means 
Defined ‘misconduct’ leading to dismissal 









Table 5: Signed decomposition of RHO2 following active variables  









RHO2 3.425 2.733 5.044 10.193 
Active variables     
GAREMB -22 30 17 27 
INFOER -34 0 54 2 
QUAL1 18 18 -83 -1 
FLEXEMP -43 -8 83 6 
DUREW1 277 -186 -82 -9 
FLEXTEMP -111 132 192 -23 
FORH1 -68 16 -22 77 
INFOCGABS -54 -89 197 16 
LIEU1 24 -32 21 -19 
FLEXGEO -49 -7 -1 84 
PRIMFIX 3 1 -3 -1 
IREM -19 -11 -7 61 
RPCOL -29 164 -17 0 
AVNAT -13 1 8 1 
NORMS -45 -27 86 14 
EXCLUS -21 -80 0 88 
PROTCH -17 -22 -24 78 
ACONCU -31 -28 -24 134 
ACLI -31 -51 -27 163 
ACONF -42 -67 3 101 
PROTPI -10 -26 -24 82 
RESP -39 -4 12 39 
 
 
 
